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I. OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
Initially conceived for intra-Community balance-of-payment support,
macro-financial assistance from the Community has been extended since
1990 to third countries, mainly those of Central and Eastern Europe, but
progressively also to other countries, in the former Soviet Union and in
the Mediterranean area, with a view to supporting their political and
economic reform efforts.
Early in the 1990s, the European Community decided to extend macro-
financial assistance to the Central and East European Countries (CEECs)
with a view to support their process of transition to a market economy. It
was also decided that, in the context of the assistance co-ordination process
agreed among the 24 industrial countries (G-24), the Commission should
enlist other donors to contribute in a similar way to support the economic
programmes that the CEECs were implementing in agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
A number of balance-of-payment support operations by the EC and the G-24
took place between 1990 and 1994 covering most CEECs. Since then, EC
macro-financial assistance in the region has been mainly concentrated in
the Balkan countries for two different although not unrelated reasons.
Firstly, the relative under-performance of the Eastern Balkans economies
and their continued need for international support to cover external imbal-
ances. Secondly, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the subse-
quent conflicts in the Western Balkans. Thus, since 1996 all disbursements of
macro-financial assistance have been in favour of four of these countries,
namely Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM and Romania.Outside the region of Central and Eastern Europe, sev-
eral other operations have been decided by the Council
since the beginning of the 1990s. They also support the
political and economic reform efforts of the beneficiary
countries and are to be implemented in connection with
support programmes from the IMF and the World
Bank. Thus, in the context of Community support for
Mediterranean countries, the Council made available
loans to Israel and Algeria in 1991, and a further loan
to Algeria was decided in late 1994.
Operations for Newly Independent States (NIS) were
approved for the first time in 1994 to cover European
NIS. Six loan operations have since then been decided
for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. In 1997, financial
assistance was extended to the Caucasian region, with
the adoption by the Council of a Commission proposal
to provide Armenia and Georgia with exceptional finan-
cial assistance, in view of the difficult political, economic
and financial conditions, including their inability to ser-
vice their financial obligations towards the Community.
Community operations have continued to incorporate
the set of principles applying to this type of assistance.
These principles underline the exceptional character of
this assistance, its complementarity to financing from
the IFIs and its macroeconomic conditionality. In parti-
cular, Community macro-financial assistance has sup-
ported efforts by recipient countries to bring about eco-
nomic reforms and structural changes. In close co-
ordination with the IMF and the World Bank, it has pro-
moted policies that are tailored to specific country needs
with the overall objective of stabilising the financial
situation and establishing market-oriented economies.
The Commission implements the assistance in consulta-
tion with the Economic and Financial Committee.
The present report assesses the economic situation, the
progress of reforms and the prospects of the countries
recipient of macro-financial assistance in 1997 and
1998, with particular reference to the implementation
of the conditions attached to it. The present report is
submitted in accordance with the Council Decisions
regarding Community macro-financial assistance to
third countries as listed in Table 1 and follows on from
the reports presented in previous years
1.
The complete list of macro-financial assistance opera-
tions decided by the Council with the corresponding dis-
bursements up to the end of 1998 appears in Table 1.
Table 2 summarises the macro-financial assistance pro-
vided by bilateral and multilateral donors in favour of
the countries recipient of EC macro-financial assistance.
Finally, macroeconomic performance and progress in
reforms in beneficiary countries are summarized in
Tables 3 and 4 and discussed country by country in the
following chapters.
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COM(98)3 of 13 January 1998.2. Macro-financial assistance in 1997 and 1998
New decisions
Compared to 1996, when only one operation for EUR
15 million in favour of Moldova was decided, the
year 1997 has registered a rather important amount of
activity in terms of new macro-financial assistance
operations decided by the Council. Three operations
for a maximum amount of EUR 555 million have been
decided in favour of Armenia, Bulgaria, FYROM and
Georgia. The only operation decided in 1998 consisted
of a loan of up to EUR 150 million to Ukraine.
FYROM had undertaken fundamental political and eco-
nomic reforms and an economic programme had been
adopted by its authorities with strong support from the
IMF and the World Bank. In this framework and in view
of the first signs of crisis in the financial sector, the
Council has decided in July 1997 to provide the country
with a long-term loan facility of a maximum amount of
EUR 40 million. Following the fulfilment of the different
conditions attached to the operation, the loan has been
released in two tranches of EUR 25 million and
EUR 15 million respectively in September 1997 and
February 1998.
The third macro-financial assistance operation in favour
of Bulgaria has also been adopted in July 1997. It con-
sists of a long-term loan facility for a maximum of
EUR 250 million with a view to ensuring a sustainable
balance-of-payment situation and strengthening the
country's reserve position. The operation had been pro-
posed by the Commission in May 1997 in view of the
economic programme adopted by the Bulgarian authori-
ties in agreement with the IFIs following the economic
difficulties and financial crisis of the winter 1996/1997.
The loan has been disbursed in two equal instalments
of EUR 125 million in February and December 1998.
The third 1997 operation has covered Armenia and Geor-
gia and has combined for the first time a mix of long-
term loans and straight grants. The total loan compo-
nent amounts to a maximum of EUR 170 million, while
the grant component should add up to EUR 95 million,
bringing the total assistance for both countries to a max-
imum of EUR 265 million. The relevant Council Deci-
sion empowers the Commission to agree with the autho-
rities of the beneficiary countries on the specific amounts
of the assistance to each of them. The Commission dis-
bursed in favour of Georgia during the summer of
1998, after fulfilment of the relevant conditions, the first
tranche of assistance comprising a loan of
EUR 110 million and a grant of EUR 10 million
financed from the EU general budget. Armenia also
received in December 1998 a first tranche of assistance
comprising EUR 28 million in the form of a loan and
EUR 8 million in the form of a grant.
In 1998, the Community has decided to provide Ukraine
with a third macro-financial assistance. Parliamentary
elections in Spring 1998 have been followed by the adop-
tion of an ambitious three-year economic programme
supported by the IMF under an Extended Fund Facility.
Against this background and the spill-over effects on
Ukraine of the Russian financial crisis in the
summer 1998, the Council has adopted in October 1998
a Commission proposal to provide supplementary
macro-financial assistance in the form of a long-term
loan of up to EUR 150 million. It is expected that the
first and possibly a second tranche of the assistance will
be disbursed in 1999.
Disbursements
Disbursements of macro-financial assistance to third
countries have amounted to a total of EUR 195 million
in 1997 and EUR 421 million in 1998. Out of the total
EUR 616 million for the two years, disbursements in
favour of CEECs have amounted to EUR 360 million,
while the total amount in favour of NIS has been EUR
256 million. Disbursements related to newly decided
operations during the period are commented on in the
previous paragraphs.
As far as previously decided operations are concerned,
the outstanding second tranche of the 1994 balance-of-
payment assistance to Romania has been reactivated in
1997 following the IMF approval of a new SBA in
April 1997. A total amount of EUR 70 million has
accordingly been paid out to Romania in two instal-
ments of EUR 40 million and EUR 30 million respec-
tively in September and December 1997. Also the
EUR 100 million second and last tranche, out of the
EUR 200 million macro-financial assistance decided in
1995 in favour of Ukraine, has been released in
September 1997, after fulfilment by the country of the
conditions attached to the loan.
Repayments and undisbursed operations
During 1997 and 1998 all macro-financial assistance
loans falling due have been honoured by the beneficiary
countries. Thus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia have repaid in 1998 the outstanding amounts relat-
ing to the assistance decided in 1990 and 1991. Also
Romania in March 1998 repaid as scheduled the first
tranche of its first EC macro-financial assistance.
Some operations decided in the first half of the 1990s
have not been fully disbursed as initially foreseen. This
has been the result either of improved external financial
conditions, mainly in terms of balance of payments and
external debt position as was the case for the Baltic coun-
tries, Hungary and Slovakia or of worsening of the poli-
tical climate and/or the slowing-down of the reform pro-
cess as in the cases of Belarus and Algeria. The last
column of Table 1 shows the undisbursed amounts.
The operations for Armenia and Georgia and Ukraine
III are likely to be implemented as originally foreseen,
while the undisbursed amounts for the CEECs are not
programmed anymore.
Other
By the end of 1998, two Commission proposals are wait-
ing for a decision by the Council. The first one concerns
±3±a EUR 20 million balance-of-payment assistance in
favour of Albania
1 which, for the first time in the case
of this country, would take the form of a loan.
The second proposal concerns the first macro-financial
assistance in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina
2. Given the
particularly difficult economic and social situation in
the country, the Commission has proposed a high degree
of concessionality through an operation totaling
EUR 60 million out of which EUR 30 million in the
form of grants.
Other outstanding Commission proposals concern Tadji-
kistan Ð for which the Commission had proposed a pos-
sible aid in the framework of the operation in favour of
Armenia and Georgia- and Azerbaijan.
3. Trends and tendencies in macro-financial assistance
The new operations in 1997 and 1998 have confirmed the
two related trends already evidenced in 1996. The first
one refers to the expansion of the geographical coverage,
the second one to the widening of the nature of macro-
financial assistance operations.
The Community's macro-financial assistance was origin-
ally intended to support macroeconomic stabilization
and the balance of payments. Over the years the number
of countries to which it was appropriate for the Commu-
nity to extend such support expanded, as a growing num-
ber of countries neighbouring the Community com-
mitted themselves to rigorous programmes of economic
reform. This led to a change in the geographic balance
of assistance from the early years, when most beneficiary
countries were in the immediate vicinity of the Commu-
nity. As a result of the conflicts in the Western Balkans, a
new tendency for enhanced macro-financial assistance to
the countries of this region is emerging as demonstrated
by the recent Commission proposals.
It also became clear that, while macro-financial assis-
tance geared to the original objective of supporting
macroeconomic stabilization and the balance of pay-
ments was still necessary for some countries, in the case
of others macro-financial assistance could more usefully
be directed to supporting the government's programme
of structural reform. This tendency emerged first in some
Central and East European countries, where macro-
financial assistance for structural reform could be effec-
tively combined with technical assistance from the Phare
programme to strengthen the capacity of institutions
that were essential to the success of the structural reform
programmes. The complementarity of the different
forms of Community assistance was enhanced by broad-
ening the dialogue with each beneficiary country to
encompass the totality of assistance to reform efforts.
This approach has been confirmed in the context of
assistance to some NIS and to the Western Balkan coun-
tries. A comparable evolution has taken place in the pro-
grammes supported by the IMF and the World Bank,
and this has led to closer co-operation between the Com-
mission and these institutions.
4. Burden-sharing
In the context of the G-24 assistance coordination pro-
cess, the European Commission in liaison with the
World Bank organises donor's conferences for support
to CEECs where the needs of resources are assessed
and the contributions from the IFIs and bilateral donors
-including the EC- are agreed in principle. For other
potential recipient countries, a similar approach is fol-
lowed through Consultative Group meetings convened
at the initiative of the World Bank.
The resources provided by different contributors to sup-
port the balance-of-payment needs of the countries reci-
pient of EC macro-financial assistance are summarised
in Table 2. Details by recipient country for the
years 1997 and 1998 are provided in Table 2.1.
Since the inception of macro-financial assistance, the
absolute amounts committed by the EC have fluctuated
substantially, in parallel with the balance-of-payment
support provided by the international community (see
Table 2 and similar tables in previous macro-financial
assistance reports).
Initially, an important feature of Community assistance
was that very large sums of money were made available
to support the programmes of the IFIs. The Community
played a key role, both as a major provider of these
funds and from 1991 as the co-ordinator of bilateral
assistance for the CEECs through the G-24.
However, as the IFIs were progressively able to mobilize
more resources through new instruments, their share in
the financing packages has risen substantially, in particu-
lar when referring only to mobilisation of new funds.
At the same time, contributions by external creditors,
both public and private, were mobilized in the form of
debt-relief and debt-reduction operations which were
particularly important in 1994 and 1995. The countries
concerned by these debt-relief and similar operations
amongst those receiving EC macro-financial assistance
have been: Algeria in 1991 and 1994; Bulgaria in 1991,
1994 and 1997; Moldova in 1996; and Ukraine in 1994
and 1995.
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2 COM(98)652 of 13.11.1998.±5±
TABLE 1: Community macro-finanacial assistance to third countries
(Status of effective disbursements as of December 1996 (in millons of ECU)
Country Maximum
amount authorized
Date and reference of
Council Decision Disbursed Amounts and Dates
of disbursements Undisbursed
A. Macro-financial assistance to CEECs
Hungary I 870 22.02.90 610 350 ± Apr. 1990 260
(structural adjustment loan) (90/83/EC) 260 ± Feb. 1991
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 375 25.02.91 375 185 ± Mar. 1991
(BOP loan) (91/106/EC) 190 ± Mar. 1992
Hungary II 180 24.06.91 180 100 ± Aug. 1991
(BOP loan) (91/310/EC) 80 ± Jan. 1993
Bulgaria I 290 24.06.91 290 150 ± Aug. 1991
(BOP loan) (91/311/EC) 140 ± Mar. 1992
Romania I 375 22.07.91 375 190 ± Jan. 1992
(BOP loan) (91/384/EC) 185 ± Apr. 1992
Albania I 70 28.09.92 70 35 ± Dec. 1992
(BOP grant) (92/482/EC) 35 ± Aug. 1993
Baltics 220 23.11.92 135 85
(BOP loans) (92/542/EC)
of which:
Estonia 40 20 Mar. 1993 20
Latvia 80 40 Mar. 1993 40
Lithuania 100 75 50 ± Jul. 1993 25
25 ± Aug. 1995
Romania II 80 27.11.92 80 Feb. 1993
(BOP loan) (92/551/EC)
Bulgaria II 110 19.10.92 110 70 ± Dec. 1994
(BOP loan) (92/511/EC) 40 ± Aug .1996
Romania III 125 20.06.94 125 55 ± Nov. 1995
(BOP loan) (94/369/EC) 40 ± Sep. 1997
30 ± Dec 1997
Albania II 35 28.11.94 35 15 ± Jun. 1995
(BOP grant) (94/773/EC) 20 ± Oct. 1996
Slovakia 130 22.12.94 Cancelled Jul. 1996 130
(BOP loan) (94/939/EC)
FYROM 40 22.07.97 40 25 ± Sep. 97
(BOP loan) (97/471/EC) 15 ± Feb. 98
Bulgaria III 250 22.07.97 250 125 ± Feb. 98
(BOP loan) (97/472/EC) 125 ± Dec. 98
TOTAL A 3150 2675 475
B. Macro-financial assistance to other third countries
Israel
1 187,5 22.07.91 187,5 Mar. 1992
(structural adjustment soft loan) (91/408/EC)
Algeria I 400 23.09.91 400 250 ± Jan. 1992
(BOP loan) (91/510/EC) 150 ± Aug. 1994
Moldova I 45 13.06.94 45 25 ± Dec 1994
(BOP loan) (94/346/EC) 20 ± Aug. 1995
Algeria II 200 22.12.94 100 Nov. 1995 100
(BOP loan) (94/936/EC)
Ukraine I 85 22.12.94 85 Dec. 1995
(BOP loan) (94/940/EC)
Belarus 55 10.04.95 30 Dec. 1995 25
(BOP loan) (95/132/EC)
Ukraine II 200 23.10.95 200 50 ± Aug. 1996
(BOP loan) (95/442/EC) 50 ± Oct. 1996
100 ± 25 Sep. 1997
Moldova II 15 25.03.96 15 Dec. 1996
(BOP loan) (96/242/EC)
Armenia and Georgia
2 265 17.11.97 156 109
(Structural adjustment loans and grants) (97/787/EC)
of which:
Armenia 36 36 28 ± 31 Dec. 1998
8 ± 29 Dec. 1998
Georgia 120 120 110 ± Jul. 1998
10 ± Aug. 98
Ukraine III 150 15.10.98 150
(98/592/EC)
TOTAL B 1602,5 1218,5 384
TOTAL AB 4752,5 3893,5 859
1 Assistance to Israe È l includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27.5 million in the form of interest rates subsidies.
2 Exceptional financial assistance, which includes loans for a maximum amount of ECU 170 million and grants for a maximum amount of ECU 95 million. Disbursements
include an ECU 28 million loan and an ECU 8 million grant for Armenia, and an ECU 110 million and an ECU 10 million for Georgia.±6±
TABLE 2: Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1998
1
2a. In millions US$
1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
IFI's 419 5607 1564 4086 1877 250 732 1949
IMF 219 4177 909 3206 1477 195 584 1259
World Bank 200 1430 655 880 400 55 148 690
Bilaterals 1618 5600 708 11202 3885 67 582 168
EU
2 1108 2190 423 855 330 19 329 168
Other bilaterals
3 511 1406 285 702 150 10 73
of which:
USA 35 100 10 15
Japan 200 850 120 350 150 54
Debt relief 2004 9645 3405 38 180
Paris Club 554 4920
London Club 4380
Other
4 1450 345 3405 38 180
2b. In percent of total commitments, including debt relief
1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
IFI's 21 50 69 27 33 79 56 92
IMF 11 37 40 21 26 62 44 59
World Bank 10 13 29 6 7 17 11 33
Bilaterals 79 50 31 73 67 21 44 8
EU
2 54 20 19 6 6 6 25 8
Other bilaterals
3 25 13 13 5 3 3 5
of which:
USA 0 1 3 1
Japan 10 8523 4
Debt relief 18 63 59 12 14
Paris Club 5 32
London Club 29
Other
4 13 2 59 12 14
2c. In percent of total commitments, excluding debt relief
1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
IFI's 21 61 69 72 80 90 65 92
IMF 11 45 40 57 63 70 52 59
World Bank 10 16 29 16 17 20 13 33
Bilaterals 79 39 31 28 20 10 35 8
EU
2 54 24 19 15 14 7 29 8
Other bilaterals
3 25 15 13 12 6 4 7
of which:
USA 0 2 4 1
Japan 10 9566 5
1 Based on Council Decisions for EU operations. No operation was decided in 1993.
2 EU macro-financial assistance.
3 Including EU Member States.
4 Syndicated commercial banks loan in favour of Algeria in 1991, debt relief in favour of Ukraine by Russia and Turkmenistan in 1994 and in 1995, debt rescheduling in
favour of Moldova by Russia in 1996, debt rescheduling in favour of Bulgaria and FYROM in 1997.
TABLE 2.1: Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1997-1998
1
(in millions of US$ and in percent of total commitments and disbursements)
Balance of payments support 1997
Total Bulgaria III FYROM
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements
mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ %
IFI's 732 56 683 54 610 58 610 58 123 47 73 34
IMF 584 44 535 42 510 48 510 48 75 28 25 12
WB (policy based) 148 11 148 12 100 10 100 10 48 18 48 23
Bilaterals 582 44 582 46 442 42 442 42 140 53 140 66
EU 329 25 329 26 284 27 284 27 45 17 45 21
USA 15 1 15 1 15 1 15 1
Japan 54 4 54 4 50 5 50 5 4 2 4 2
Other bilaterals 4040 4242
Debt relief 180 14 180 14 93 9 93 9 87 33 87 41
London Club
Paris Club
Other 180 14 180 14 93 9 93 9 87 33 87 41
Total 1314 100 1265 100 1051 100 1052 100 263 100 213 100±7±
TABLE 2.1 (continued): Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1997-1998
1
Balance of payments support 1998
Total Ukraine III
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements
mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ % mio US$ %
IFI's 1949 92 673 100 1949 92 673 100
IMF 1259 59 333 49 1259 59 333 49
WB (policy based) 690 33 340 51 690 33 340 51
Bilaterals 168 8 168 8
EU 168 8 168 8
USA
Japan
Other bilaterals
Debt relief
London Club
Paris Club
Other
Total 2117 100 673 100 2117 100 673 100
1 Disbursements are shown under the year of corresponding commitments.
TABLE 3: Selected economic indicators
1995 1996 1997
1998
Programme
1 Estimates
GDP at constant prices (Percent change)
Armenia 6,9 5,8 3,1 5,2 4,5
Bulgaria 2,1 ÿ10,9 ÿ7,4 5,0 4,5
FYROM ÿ1,2 0,8 1,5 5,0 3,5
Georgia 2,0 10,5 12,0 10,0 5,0
Romania 7,1 3,9 ÿ6,6 ÿ4,0 ÿ7,3
Ukraine ÿ12,0 ÿ10,0 ÿ3,0 0,0 ÿ1,7
Consumer price (end year) (Percent change)
Armenia 31,9 5,7 21,9 9,0 3,8
Bulgaria 32,9 310,8 579,7 9,0 1,0
FYROM 8,6 ÿ0,7 2,7 3,0 1,0
Georgia 57,4 13,7 7,3 6,0 12,9
Romania 27,8 56,9 151,4 44,8 40,6
Ukraine 182,0 39,7 10,0 29,0 22,0
Fiscal balance (Percent of GDP)
Armenia* ÿ12,0 ÿ9,3 ÿ5,9 ÿ5,3 ÿ5,9
Bulgaria ÿ6,4 ÿ13,4 ÿ2,6 0,0 1,3
FYROM ÿ1,3 ÿ0,4 ÿ0,4 ÿ0,5 ÿ0,5
Georgia* ÿ4,5 ÿ4,4 ÿ3,8 ÿ2,5 ÿ3,4
Romania ÿ2,6 ÿ4,0 ÿ3,6 ÿ3,7 ÿ4,0
Ukraine ÿ4,9 ÿ3,2 ÿ5,6 ÿ2,8 ÿ3,5
Current account (Percent of GDP)
Armenia** ÿ37,5 ÿ27,9 ÿ27,8 ÿ21,6 ÿ23,7
Bulgaria ÿ0,5 1,3 4,4 ÿ0,7 ÿ0,6
FYROM ÿ6,1 ÿ7,3 ÿ7,0 ÿ7,3 ÿ7,4
Georgia** ÿ14,0 ÿ8,0 ÿ6,7 ÿ10,0 ÿ12,7
Romania ÿ4,9 ÿ7,3 ÿ6,7 ÿ7,9 ÿ7,7
Ukraine ÿ4,4 ÿ2,7 ÿ3,4 ÿ2,8 ÿ1,2
Official foreign exchange reserves (end year) (Months of imports)
Armenia 1,6 2,2 3,1 3,3 3,6
Bulgaria 2,9 1,6 4,0 6,7 5,7
FYROM 1,9 2,0 2,0 2,3 2,3
Georgia 2,7 2,7 2,4 2,3 0,6
Romania 1,9 2,1 3,6 NA 3,6
Ukraine 3,7 5,2 5,6 0,9 0,9
1 Programme targets as set in : the mid-term review for the second annual arrangement under the ESAF in January 98 for Armenia, September 98 (EFF arrangement) for
Bulgaria, April 1997 for FYROM , July 1998 for Georgia, October 1998 for Ukraine. For Romania, no target for 1998 were included in the last IMF programme,
approved in 1997 and which expired in May 1998. Figures are IMF Staff estimates prepared for the the last Article IV consultations.
* On a cash basis.
** Excluding official transfers.
Sources: National authorities and IMF.±8±
TABLE 4: Status of economic reforms
ARMENIA
1. Price liberalisation Most prices have been liberalised and consumer subsidies have been sharply reduced, including those on bread.
Prices of a very few items (public utilities, rents) are regulated.
2. Trade liberalisation Commitment to a liberal trade regime for goods. Trade in services is largely free of restrictions. Membership of
the WTO expected in 1999. Armenia has accepted the obligations set out in Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of
Agreement.
3. Exchange regime Floating exchange rate. Limited official intervention.
4. Foreign direct investment Liberal policy towards foreign direct investment, notably, absence of restrictions on repatriation of profits and
capital.
5. Monetary policy Appropriate. However, limited instruments available to the central bank. Treasury bills with several maturities.
One-year T-bills since June 1997. High interest rates.
6. Public finances Substantial improvement in tax and customs administration (presumptive tax payments, collection of VAT and
excises on imports at the border, improved revenue administration) and in targeting the social safety net.
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
Privatisation of agricultural land and of small and medium-sized enterprises nearly completed, process for large
enterprises progressing satisfactorily, mainly through international tenders. Of 1997 GDP 60% was produced in
the private sector. Steps being taken to financially rehabilitate the power industry. Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion responsible for setting electricity tariffs.
8. Financial sector reform The banking system (33 banks, of which three state-owned) is becoming one of the most developed sectors of the
economy, thanks to the tight supervision of the central bank and the wide range of measures adopted to strength-
en the sector: minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy, and solvency requirements, virtual elimination of
bad debts. The Government is currently privatising its assets in the Savings Bank and in the Ardshinbank. Lack
of a well-functioning inter-bank market.
BULGARIA
1. Price liberalisation The share of controlled prices in the consumer price index basket was about 16% in early 1998. In addition, the
prices of several basic goods are monitored. The prices of energy products are being progressively liberalised.
2. Trade liberalisation The regime is largely liberalised. The import surcharge which was introduced in 1996 was removed ahead of sche-
dule on 1
st January 1999.
3. Exchange regime Lev pegged to the DM from July 1997 to December 1998, then to the Euro since January 1999, under a currency
board regime.
4. Foreign direct investment Under the new law adopted in late 1997, foreign investors can freely repatriate profits and proceeds from the
liquidation of investments. Foreign companies allowed to buy land.
5. Monetary policy Central bank responsible for operating the currency board. Cannot lend to the government and can lend to com-
mercial banks only if the stability of the banking system is seriously endangered.
6. Public finances The fiscal stance was tighter than programmed in 1997 and 1998. Tax collection has improved. Further reforms
are planned to improve the efficiency of the tax system and increase fiscal transparency.
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
From the beginning of the process in 1992 to late 1998, only 26% of long-term assets have been privatised. After
the rapid progress achieved in 1997, 1998 was marked by a noticeable slowdown in the pace of privatisation.
8. Financial sector reform The financial position of the banking sector has improved substantially since the crisis in 1996, thanks to tigh-
tened bank regulation and supervision. Further restructuring is hampered by slow progress in privatisation.
FYROM
1. Price liberalisation Price liberalisation has been essentially completed. Price controls exist for only very few products.
2. Trade liberalisation A small number of tariff and non-tariff barriers remain in place, but 95% of goods are freely traded (average
tariff rate of 15%). Revised customs code approved by government.
3. Exchange regime From early 1994, de facto peg of denar to DM at 27 denar to the DM; since devaluation of July 1997, 31 denar to
the DM.
4. Foreign direct investment The environment for FDI has improved recently. However, approval from the government is still requested to
carry out some types of foreign direct investments, while the absence of a properly functioning market for land
are also hampering the FDI inflows. FDI inflows increased substantially in 1998 as the authorities have been
more open to FDI. Overall, the capital account remains largely regulated.
5. Monetary policy Tight monetary policy based on the exchange rate anchor.
6. Public finances Tight fiscal policies continued in 1997 and 1998, (especially through a reform of the pension system and a wage
freeze following the devaluation of the denar in July 1997).
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
Privatisation programme begun in 1993; almost 1200 out 1216 enterprises have finalised privatisation though only
some have been restructured. Private sector accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP. Slow progress in priva-
tisation and restructuring of agro-industrial conglomerates.±9±
TABLE 4 (continued): Status of economic reforms
8. Financial sector reform Two-tier banking system. There are 20 banks, one branch of a foreign bank and 19 savings banks. Sector is domi-
nated by Stopanska Banka, which has been rehabilitated and partially sold to a foreign investor. Banking super-
vision through National Bank. Lending to 22 largest debtor enterprises closely monitored.
GEORGIA
1. Price liberalisation Almost all prices have been liberalised.
2. Trade liberalisation Liberal international trade policy. Low uniform customs tariff of 5% and 12% applied to almost all imports.
Export prohibition only on scrap metal. Georgia has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Articles
of Agreement and is expected to become a member of the WTO in 1999.
3. Exchange regime The lari is not subject to exchange restrictions. Auctions at the Tblisi Interbank Currency Exchange (TICEX).
4. Foreign direct investment Adequate overall legislation. Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits and no limitations on holding foreign-
currency bank accounts. Foreign investors allowed only to lease not to own, agricultural land. Foreign residents
are allowed to buy real estate and to lease land in the same way as domestic residents. Legal framework for urban
and industrial land under consideration by the Parliament.
5. Monetary policy Central bank intervention in the TICEX and banks' reserve requirements (12%) were the main instruments of
monetary control. Development of indirect monetary instruments. Sales of Treasury bills since August 1997. High
interest rates.
6. Public finances Budgetary revenue estimated at 10% of GDP; expenditure estimated at 14% of GDP. Low level of capital expen-
diture (1.1% of GDP). Substantial increase in expenditure arrears in 1997 and 1998. Development of a Treasury
system.
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
Privatisation of small enterprises virtually completed. Most medium-sized and large enterprises privatised. All
arable land except in Abkhasia and South Ossetia distributed to private farmers. Legal framework for a function-
ing agricultural land market in place. Collection rates in the energy sector and tariffs still low. A privatisation
strategy for the power sector (both distribution and generating companies) is being implemented.
8. Financial sector reform Role of former state banks diminished. 53 commercial banks. Until the Russian crisis, continued improvement in
compliance with prudential regulations. Introduction of international accounting standards completed.
ROMANIA
1. Price liberalisation Price liberalisation has been essentially completed and consumer subsidies eliminated. Prices of a limited number
of items (essentially public utilities and energy) are regulated, representing about 7% of the CPI basket.
2. Trade liberalisation Liberalisation of foreign trade regime largely completed, although still characterized by temporary derogations
from import tariffs and special tariff quotas. All export restrictions were eliminated as of 1 January 1998. An
import surcharge of 6% was introduced in October 1998 to be gradually reduced over three years.
3. Exchange regime The leu has been freely floating since February 1997, but the central bank has intervened frequently to smoothen
the evolution of the exchange rate. Full current account convertibility implemented in March 1998, following the
acceptance of the IMF's Article VIII.
4. Foreign direct investment The FDI regime is open and non-discriminatory; profit may be freely repatriated. Since early 1997, foreign inves-
tors can own land necessary to carry out their activities. Portfolio investment by non-residents in fixed income
securities was still not possible, although the T-bills market was technically open to non-residents in
September 1998.
5. Monetary policy National Bank of Romania (NBR) is independent, and financing for the government is limited in amount and
time. In 1997 and 1998, the objective of monetary policy was the level of base money, although the central bank
ensured an appreciation of the real exchange rate to fight inflation. The NBR stopped its directed credits to the
economy and relied more on indirect instruments like open market operations and changes in reserve require-
ments.
6. Public finances Basic tax reform already completed. Consolidated government deficit reached 3.6% of GDP in 1997, but with all
previously hidden quasi-fiscal subsidies now appearing in the budget. 1998 saw a small increase in the deficit.
Revenues and expenses fell considerably as a percentage of GDP, and are amongst the lowest in the transition
countries. The fiscal system is characterised by the existence of many exemptions and special provisions. The gov-
ernment intends to introduce a global income tax in 2000.
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
Acceleration of privatisation and restructuring during the first months of 1997, later on stalled until late in 1998.
Large-scale privatisation has been disappointing, although there were a few important transactions at the end of
1998. Financial discipline for the mostly large and loss-making public companies has not improved, with total
arrears in the economy growing fast.
8. Financial sector reform Reform of the banking sector has been slow so far, although new laws passed in 1997 and 1998 greatly improved
the legislative framework. Despite a massive recapitalisation of two of the largest public banks in 1997, public
banks have continued to experience serious balance sheet problems. Only one small public bank has been priva-
tised since the onset of transition (in late 1998). Capital market developed rapidly in 1997 with higher volumes
and more listings, but capitalisation and activity collapsed in 1998.±1 0±
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TABLE 4 (continued): Status of economic reforms
UKRAINE
1. Price liberalisation Most goods no longer subject to price declaration (cost coverage is about 80% on average). Increases for house-
holds in prices of coal, electricity, gas and transport, but these are still below full cost-recovery. Rents also
increase.
2. Trade liberalisation System of state orders abolished, except for grain for budgetary reasons. Budget allocations for state procurement
of agricultural products limited to needs of budgetary organisations and based on market-determined prices.
Import regime free of quantitative restrictions, with a few exceptions, which are primarily for health and safety
reasons. Maximum import tariff 30%. No export quotas and licences (except for hides and skins).
3. Foreign exchange regime From September 1998, the authorities began intervening administratively in the inter-bank currency exchange.
4. Foreign direct investment Tax relief granted to some foreign direct investments constituting at least 20% of an enterprise's charter capital.
This relief was granted by a 1993 decree and provided for exemption from income and profit tax for 5 years. In
1997, a law was passed that provided tax exemptions (almost all taxes) to investors which invest more than
USD 100 million in the automobile industry.
5. Monetary policy Central bank credit to commercial banks allocated mostly through the Lombard facility, and to a lesser extent
through auction. However, the central bank has conducted a very tight policy and provided very little refinancing.
Central Bank refinancing rate adjusted to ensure that it remains positive in real terms.
6. Public finances Since 1992, budget gradually tightened and rationalised, including reform of VAT, enterprise and income taxes.
Reduction of public expenditure from 72% of GDP in 1992 to some 37% in 1998. Ratio of revenue/GDP: 35%
in 1998.
7. Privatisation and enterprise
restructuring
Mass voucher privatisation programme launched at beginning of 1995 and concluded at beginning of 1998.
According to the Ministry of Statistics, privatised enterprises accounted for about 60% of industrial output
and more than 50% of industrial employment in the first quarter of 1998.
8. Financial sector reform Measures to strengthen supervision and regulation of the banking sector being implemented with the help of the
IMF, the World Bank, the EU (Tacis programme) and USAID.II. ARMENIA
1. Introduction
Armenia recovered for a fifth consecutive year in 1998,
at a rapid pace (about 5%) in view of the impact of
the Russian crisis. Thanks to the relatively small share
of exports (17% of the total in 1998) going to Russia
and to the sound monetary, fiscal and structural policies,
the country coped satisfactorily with this external crisis.
In 1998, the current account deficit (excluding grants)
narrowed to around 25% of GDP; the level of FDI
increased, as a result of rapid progress in the privatisa-
tion programme; gross international reserves improved
further; and external debt was reduced to less than
45% of GDP. Structural reforms all progressed: sub-
stantial advances were made in price and trade liberalisa-
tion and with regard to privatisation and banking sector
reform. However, the first priority for Armenia was still
to improve exports and attract FDI. The country
remained heavily dependent on foreign financing on con-
cessional terms.
In February 1996, the IMF Board adopted a three-year
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of
some USD 150 million in favour of Armenia. In
December 1998, it approved a third annual arrangement
under this facility.
The Community adopted on 17 November 1997 a Deci-
sion aimed at providing exceptional financial assistance
to Armenia and Georgia in the form of a mix of long-
term loans and successive annual grants (respectively
up to EUR 170 million and EUR 95 million). This assis-
tance was subject to the full settlement by both countries
of their outstanding financial obligations towards the
Community and to the rigorous implementation of the
macroeconomic programmes supported by the IMF
three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
Following real GDP growth of 3% in 1997, the Arme-
nian economy continued to recover for a fifth consecu-
tive year in 1998. Growth was about 5% in 1998.
Since 1994, inflation has been sharply reduced. The aver-
age inflation level fell to 18.6% in 1996 (5.7% on a year-
on-year basis in December) and fell further to 14% in
1997. It rose, however, to close to 21% by year-end.
The average inflation rate slowed to about 10% in
1998. The budget deficit target of 6.7% of GDP for
1997 was largely met, with higher tax revenues offsetting
shortfalls in grants and non-tax revenues. In 1998, the
budget deficit (including grants) reached a level equiva-
lent to about 6% of GDP, short of the target of
5.3%. As a result of the financial crisis, the Government
tightened its credit policy, raised refinancing rates and
reduced its possibility to obtain financing at a reasonable
price on the T-Bill market.
Partly because of the blockade imposed on Armenia
owing to the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh issue, the
current account deficit (excluding official transfers)
widened in 1997 to 28% of GDP, but narrowed a little
in 1998, despite the negative effects of the Russian crisis
on Armenian exports and the blockade imposed on
Armenia by some neighbouring countries. The deficit
was expected to be increasingly financed by FDI as a
result of rapid progress in the privatisation programme
for large enterprises. Gross international reserves
increased to almost 250 million USD by end-1997, well
above the target, and to around USD 300 million
(3.6 months' imports) at the end of 1998.
Armenia's foreign debt, which rose from 200 million
USD at end-94 to about 600 million USD (some 38%
of GDP) at end-96, represented around 48% of GDP
at the end of 1997 but was expected to decrease to
43% in 1998. The country fully settled its outstanding
financial obligations to the Community (EUR 51 million)
in December 1998.
3. Structural Reforms
Important progress was made in price and trade liberal-
isation. Armenia notified the IMF that it accepted the
obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment and Armenia is expected to become a WTO mem-
ber in 1999. With regard to privatisation, the Govern-
ment completed the process for small-scale enterprises
and made significant progress with medium- and large-
scale enterprises through cash auctions and international
tenders. It approved the privatisation of all remaining
state flour mills and bakeries. Moreover, 80% of the for-
merly state-owned housing stock and 90% of the agri-
cultural land was in private hands by the end of 1998.
Much remains to be done, however, in large enterprise
restructuring, notably with 12 major enterprises in the
process of being sold through international tender. Sig-
nificant progress was made in reforming the banking sec-
tor, with adoption of international accounting standards,
continued improvement in the prudential indicators and
the writing-off of all pre-1997 non-performing loans.
Progress in the privatisation of Ardshinbank was stalled
as a result of the financial difficulties in Russia. The legal
framework evolved further: the law on bankruptcy, some
revisions to the major banking and commercial laws
necessary for WTO accession were passed in 1997. Public
sector reform lagged behind.
4. Implementation of the Exceptional Financial
Assistance
In order to implement the Council Decision of
17 November providing exceptional financial assistance
to Armenia and Georgia, a Commission staff mission
visited Yerevan in July 1998 to negotiate the amounts,
terms and conditions of this assistance and reached an
agreement in principle on the Memorandum of Under-
standing and Loan Agreement. Both documents were
signed in December 1998. The disbursement of the first
tranche (EUR 28 million in the form of a loan and
EUR 8 million in the form of a grant) of this assistance
took place in late December after full settlement by
Armenia of its outstanding financial obligations to the
Community (EUR 51 million) in the context of an agree-
ment reached between the International Monetary Fund
±1 1±and the Armenian authorities on a third annual arrange-
ment under the Fund's Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF).
The implementation of this Community programme for
Armenia will cover a four-to five-year period. The assis-
tance is, however, conditional on Armenia pursuing rig-
orously its reform efforts, in particular in terms of priva-
tising and restructuring enterprises and creating the
necessary conditions to attract foreign investment.
III. BULGARIA
1. Introduction
1997 was a year of remarkable contrasts in Bulgaria's
economic and political fortunes. At the start of 1997,
the country was in deep crisis Ð without a government,
and in the midst of a severe recession. There was a very
real prospect of a renewed default on the country's for-
eign debt, as foreign reserves were practically exhausted.
The year ended with a strong and stable government in
office, and with the first results of a stabilisation strategy
centred on a currency board arrangement. 1998 showed
the consolidation of the progress achieved in stabilising
the economy.
Bulgaria is receiving substantial support from the inter-
national community for its reform efforts. A stand-by
arrangement with the IMF was successfully completed
in June 1998, and subsequently, the Fund approved a
three-year arrangement under the Extended Fund Facil-
ity to support the government's medium-term economic
programme for the period July 1998-June 2001.
The acute economic and political crisis which occurred in
late 1996 and early 1997 appears to have produced a sea
change in Bulgaria's attitude to reform, both at a politi-
cal level, and in the population at large. The government
is committed to far-reaching structural reforms. Not-
withstanding the short-term impact of restrictive macro-
economic policies and structural reforms on living stan-
dards, there is little serious opposition to the
government's programme.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
Political and economic difficulties which had been build-
ing up during 1996 came to a head in February 1997 with
the collapse of the socialist government and a bout of
hyperinflation: prices rose by 40% in January 1997,
and by 240% in February. A newly elected reformist
government opted for a stabilisation strategy based on
sound financial policies and an ambitious structural
reform programme. The boldness of this programme
and the strong commitment of the government to its
implementation attracted substantial support from offi-
cial creditors.
A stand-by agreement was agreed with the Fund in
April. The programme's objectives were reached and,
in some cases, even surpassed. A key element of the pro-
gramme was the introduction from July 1997 of a cur-
rency board arrangement, under which the central bank
is obliged to buy and sell unlimited amounts of domestic
currency at a fixed exchange rate of 1000 leva to the
deutsche mark: the immediate consequence of this sys-
tem is that the size of the domestic money supply is
dependent on the central bank's stock of foreign
exchange reserves.
1997 outcomes were better than programmed and stabi-
lisation continued to strengthen in 1998. After one and a
half-years of recession, economic activity in Bulgaria
started to recover in the second half of 1997. Following
a contraction by a cumulative 17% in 1996-1997, real
GDP is expected to increase by 4% in 1998. Inflation
has been slowing faster than anticipated. Since end-
1997, inflation has been running at less than 1% per
month on average. Interest rates have been converging
rapidly towards peg currency levels, mainly as a result
of the remonetisation of the economy, reflecting the
increased confidence in the currency.
The impressive stabilisation results observed in 1997 and
the consolidation of these achievements in 1998 owe
much to the strong fiscal stance, the CBA's impact on
interest rates and the renewal of structural reform
efforts. Expenditure restraint and improvements in tax
collection yielded a general government deficit of 2.6%
of GDP in 1997, compared with a deficit target of 4%
in the programme agreed with the Fund. Fiscal perfor-
mance continued to be strong in 1998. Latest forecasts
point to a budget surplus of 1.3% of GDP against a def-
icit target of 2.7% of GDP in the budget law.
Successful macroeconomic stabilisation, combined with
the government's commitment to accelerating privatisa-
tion, produced a substantial rise in foreign direct
investments (FDI) in 1997. Inflows of FDI reached the
equivalent of 4.8% of GDP, and exceeded the total
amount of FDI received between 1991 and 1996. The
current account and trade balances moved into substan-
tial surpluses, amounting to 4.3% and 3.9% of GDP
respectively. This was the result of a fall in imports,
reflecting the depth of the recession, rather than a strong
export performance. The net effect of the balance-of-
payment developments was a strong increase in the cen-
tral bank's foreign reserves. These rose from under USD
500 million in January 1997 to USD 1.9 billion in
January 1998.
External developments were somewhat unfavourable in
1998. The trade and current account balances deterio-
rated in the first half of this year, as a result of a rapid
growth in imports, driven by rising domestic demand,
and a fall in exports due to decreasing foreign demand
and lower international prices. On the capital account,
inflows of FDI were about a third of the amount
recorded in the first half of 1997, reflecting a slowdown
in privatisation and the turmoil in emerging markets.
The decline in FDI inflows and net portfolio investments
was partially compensated by disbursements of balance-
of-payment loans from official creditors. The latter con-
tributed to maintaining the reserves of the central bank
at a high level, the equivalent of over 5 months of
imports of goods and services.
±1 2±Balance-of-payment developments in 1998 also reflect
the impact of the Russian crisis on the Bulgarian econo-
my. Bulgaria's trade links with Russia are relatively
small (exports to Russia accounted for 8% of total
exports in 1997) but trade with other CIS countries
remains significant (18% of total exports). A prolonged
crisis in Russia with a spillover to neighbouring countries
and the European Union could have serious implications
for exports and economic growth. By contrast, the tur-
moil in international financial markets has so far had lit-
tle impact on the financial sector. The exposure of Bul-
garian banks to Russia is limited and the stock market
is still underdeveloped. However, prospects for external
financing have become less favourable, as a result of
the reduced interest of foreign investors in Bulgaria's pri-
vatisation programme and costlier access to interna-
tional financial markets, which has led the government
to postpone an issue of Eurobonds.
3. Structural Reforms
Since taking office in Spring 1997, the government has
moved rapidly to catch up on long-delayed structural
reforms. Price controls, which had been progressively
reintroduced by the previous administration, have been
essentially abandoned: the remaining controls affect
mainly energy and public services. The trade regime
has been further liberalised. In particular, the import sur-
charge introduced in 1996 was lowered from 4% to 2%
on 1 July 1998 according to the agreed timetable, and the
Government has decided to remove it ahead of schedule
at the end of 1998.
The privatisation process has been relaunched. The gov-
ernment has taken measures to reinvigorate enterprise
privatisation and substantial progress has been achieved
in this field. The cumulative share of divested state-
owned long-term enterprise assets amounted to 26% in
September 1998 against 5.1% at the end of 1996. How-
ever, compared to the spurt of progress made in mid-
1997, there has been some slowdown in privatisation in
the first half of 1998. A wide range of privatisation meth-
ods is used by the government. Management and
employee buyouts are the main way of privatising smal-
ler enterprises. This form of privatisation may not be
conducive to rapid restructuring. The new owners are
likely to have little capital of their own, and will have dif-
ficulty in raising funds while banks maintain their cur-
rent cautious approach to lending.
The companies cut off from the banking system under
the Isolation Programme undergo some restructuring
before being liquidated or privatised. The programme
has been successfully implemented despite some delays.
The mandate of the programme has been extended by
6 months, until 1 July 1999. This programme has been
instrumental in preventing the widening of the budget
deficit and the emergence of quasi-fiscal deficits. Privati-
sation of the banking sector is proving difficult. To date,
two banks have been privatised, one in 1997 (UBB) and
another one in 1998 (Postbank). The Bank Consolida-
tion Company (BCC), an institution in charge of the
consolidation and restructuring of state banks, devel-
oped in early 1998 a strategy for the privatisation of
the four remaining state banks in which the BCC is a
majority shareholder (Bulbank, Expressbank, Hebros-
bank and Biochim).
Since the 1996-1997 banking crisis, progress has been
made in strengthening the banking system through mea-
sures to reinforce banking supervision and through the
closure of the weakest banks. As a result, the financial
position of the banking sector has improved signifi-
cantly, and accordingly, no financial support has been
given to state banks. All banks currently meet the mini-
mum capital adequacy ratio of 8%.
In the medium term, the stock market may provide a
source of investment funds for Bulgarian private enter-
prise. To date, one state enterprise has been privatised
through the stock exchange, and it is the only enterprise
whose shares are traded on the official floor. However, a
lively over-the-counter market has developed, due in part
to the decision of the authorities to sell their residual
shares in the 1000 enterprises included in the first wave
of mass privatisation. The second voucher privatisation
programme launched in the autumn should further boost
the role of the stock exchange.
Sustained structural reforms now hold the key to Bulgar-
ia's economic prospects. With the exchange rate fixed
under the currency board arrangement Ðand inflation
expected to remain above Western European levels for
some timeÐ Bulgarian enterprises need to achieve sus-
tained improvements in productivity in order to avoid
losing competitiveness. Continued fast privatisation of
state enterprises is essential in order to facilitate this pro-
cess, and fiscal policy must remain supportive of a stable
economic climate which will encourage investment.
Increased foreign involvement in the banking sector will
help improve the efficiency of financial intermediation
and allow Bulgarian entrepreneurs to take advantage
of the favourable conditions for investment which cur-
rently exist.
4. Implementation of Macro-Financial assistance
A first macro-financial loan of some EUR 290 million to
Bulgaria was decided by the Council in 1991, and dis-
bursed in two instalments in 1991 and 1992. The loan
was fully repaid in two instalments in December 1997
and March 1998.
A further EUR 110 million loan was approved in 1992,
but because of repeated policy slippages, its disburse-
ment was much delayed. A first instalment of EUR
70 million was disbursed in 1994 in the framework of
the stand-by arrangement agreed with the IMF in May
of that year. Disbursement of the outstanding EUR
40 million instalment did not take place until the second
half of 1996, following the approval by the IMF of a new
stand-by arrangement.
A third Community macro-financial loan of EUR
250 million was decided in July 1997 in the framework
of the stand-by arrangement agreed with the IMF in
April of that year. The first instalment of EUR 125 mil-
lion was disbursed in February 1998. Disbursement of
±1 3±the second and last instalment took place in
December 1998.
The possibility of further macro-financial support from
the Community to Bulgaria is envisaged in order to com-
plement, together with other donors, the resources pro-
vided by the IMF and the World Bank under the EFF
arrangement reached in July with the Fund.
IV. GEORGIA
1. Introduction
Georgia achieved a very high growth rate in 1997, conti-
nuing the positive trend of the economy since 1995. In
1998, as a result of the Russian financial crisis (Russia
accounts for about 30% of exports of goods and also
significant inward remittances) and bad results in the
agricultural sector (because of drought), GDP growth
was expected to decline to below 5%. In 1997, the tight
monetary and credit policies began to bear fruit in the
form of a reduced state budget deficit and a deceleration
in inflation. However, fiscal difficulties, which were
already a cause for concern in 1997, worsened in the sec-
ond half of 1998, because of slower growth and increas-
ing tax evasion. Public sector salary and social security
arrears accumulated further. As a result of the external
crisis, the current account deficit, already large in 1997,
widened in 1998, and in the second half of 1998 the cur-
rency depreciated sharply against the USD. Central bank
interventions reduced the country's gross foreign
exchange reserves by around 50%. Progress in structural
reforms has been encouraging. Very positive develop-
ments have been recorded in privatisation and in bank
restructuring.
In July 1998, the IMF Board formally approved the third
annual arrangement under a three-year ESAF (USD
245 million) adopted in February 1996. However, in
November 1998, an IMF mission was not in a position
to conclude favourably the third mid-term review under
this ESAF, as a result of very low revenue collection and
the inappropriate exchange rate policy.
The Community adopted on 17 November a Decision
aimed at providing exceptional financial assistance to
Armenia and Georgia in the form of a mix of long-term
loans and successive annual grants (respectively up to
EUR 170 million and EUR 95 million). This assistance
was subject to the full settlement by both countries of
their outstanding financial obligations towards the Com-
munity and to the rigorous implementation of the
macroeconomic programmes supported by the IMF
three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
Following a sharp decline from 1990 to 1994, real GDP
began to stabilise in 1995. This positive evolution was
consolidated by GDP growth of some 10.5% in 1996
and around 12% in 1997. Growth decelerated sharply
in 1998 as a result of the Russian financial crisis and
bad results in the agricultural sector caused by adverse
weather conditions.
After hyperinflation in 1994, end-of-period inflation was
reduced to some 57% in 1995 and 14% in 1996. It
decreased further to around 8% in 1997 thanks to tight
monetary and credit policies, but increased in 1998 as a
result of the sharp depreciation of the currency against
the USD in early December 1998.
The overall deficit of the general government (on a com-
mitment basis and including grants) was further reduced
from 4.5% of GDP in 1996 to around 3.5% in 1997, but
failed to meet the IMF target of 2.8%. In 1998, the inef-
fective collection of tax revenues became one of the main
threats to Georgia's continuing recovery and financial
stability. The overall budget deficit target of 2.5% of
GDP (on a cash basis) agreed for 1998 was not met.
The current account deficit (excluding official transfers)
narrowed to about 8% of GDP (or USD 370 million)
in 1996 from 14% in 1995. It decreased further to
6.7% of GDP (or USD 340 million) in 1997. However,
in 1998, this positive evolution was reversed as a result
of expanding imports from and contracting exports to
Russia. FDI increased in 1997 and 1998, as a result of
growing foreign interest in Georgia. Gross foreign
exchange reserves, which represented 2.7 months'
imports in 1996, decreased in relative terms to 2.4 months
in 1997, and fell sharply to less than 1 month in 1998 as a
result of repeated central bank interventions on the mar-
kets to prevent the Georgian currency from depreciating.
In early December, the central bank ceased its interven-
tions and, consequently, the Lari depreciated by 60%
against the USD.
Since its independence, Georgia has accumulated a for-
eign debt which amounts to some 30% of GDP and
represents mainly payments arrears. Georgia reached
rescheduling agreements with most of its creditors and
could face all cash payments obligations. Georgia fully
settled its outstanding financial obligations towards the
Community (EUR 131 million) in July 1998. A payment
of USD 22 million to Turkmenistan in December 1998
opened the way for discussions of a possible rescheduling
of Georgia's arrears towards this country.
3. Structural Reforms
Structural reforms were implemented in line with IMF
and World Bank expectations. Following broad comple-
tion of price and trade liberalisation, Georgia remained
committed to a liberal trade system and was expected
to become a member of the WTO in 1999. Privatisation
proceeded satisfactorily: more than 60% of arable land
(arable land on all Georgian territory except Abkhazia
and South Ossetia) was distributed to private farmers.
Most of the remaining agricultural land was allocated
through long-term leases on a competitive basis. Small-
scale privatisation was virtually complete and privatisa-
tion of medium- and large-scale enterprises was
advanced, with more than 960 of 1160 enterprises priva-
tised. In the energy sector, a comprehensive privatisation
programme was being implemented, while progress in
developing a sound legal and regulatory framework
was satisfactory. However, despite repeated efforts, col-
lection rates remained insufficient. A major reduction
±1 4±in the size of the public sector and a progressive reform
of the health sector were under way. A market-oriented
legal framework was being developed with the adoption
of the civil code, a new tax code, the customs code, laws
on customs tariffs, on privatisation, on agricultural land
ownership, bankruptcy and the energy sector. Progress
in establishing a Treasury system was impressive, and a
very thorough plan of bank restructuring was being
actively implemented. Less had been achieved, however,
in developing the enforcement capacity of the legal sys-
tem and in fighting corruption.
4. Implementation of Exceptional Financial Assistance
The Community adopted on 17 November 1997 a Deci-
sion aimed at providing exceptional financial assistance
to Armenia and Georgia. Towards the end of 1997,
Georgia met the necessary conditions to benefit from this
assistance. It was willing to shortly settle the total
amount of its outstanding financial obligations towards
the Community (at that time EUR 127 million, including
interest on arrears) and was satisfactorily implementing
its adjustment and reform programme in the context of
the current IMF ESAF arrangement.
Accordingly, the Commission initiated discussions with
the Georgian authorities and reached an agreement in
principle on the amounts, terms and conditions attached
to this assistance. This agreement was signed by the
Georgian authorities and ratified by the Georgian Parlia-
ment in late 1997. In August 1998, the Commission dis-
bursed the first tranche under the Community assistance
(EUR 110 million in the form of a loan and EUR 10 mil-
lion in the form of a grant). This disbursement took
place after full settlement by Georgia of its outstanding
financial obligations towards the Community (EUR
131 million) in July 1997 and in the context of the agree-
ment reached between the International Monetary Fund
and the country's authorities on a third annual arrange-
ment under the Fund's Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF).
The implementation of the Community programme for
Georgia will cover a four-to five-year period. The assis-
tance is, however, subject to the country pursuing rigor-
ously its reform efforts, in particular in terms of privatis-
ing and restructuring enterprises and creating the
necessary conditions to attract foreign investment.
The implementation of the second tranche of this assis-
tance (grant tranche of EUR 9 million), which was
scheduled for the end of 1998, was postponed to
early 1999 as a result of disappointing implementation
by Georgia of its third annual programme, notably with
respect to targets for collection rates for duties and taxes
and as a result of the inappropriate exchange rate policy.
V. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA
1. Introduction
After the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation and the
imposition of trade and transit sanctions, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) faced a
severe economic and financial crisis. Near-hyperinfla-
tionary conditions developed and the public deficit
reached some 13.5% of GDP in 1993. At the same time,
the balance-of-payment situation worsened and the ser-
vicing of foreign debt was temporarily suspended.
Between 1990 and 1995, the country's GDP fell by
almost two fifths and unemployment increased from
17% in 1990 to more than 25% in 1995. Reacting to this
situation, the authorities took, especially from 1994,
strong stabilisation measures and engaged in structural
reform. As a result, in 1996 inflation came down to
2.5% and the public deficit was reduced to 0.5%. How-
ever, growth remained weak and unemployment contin-
ued to increase (32% in 1996).
The economic programme of the authorities was strongly
supported by the international financial institutions. Fol-
lowing disbursement by the IMF of some USD 36 million
under a Systemic Transformation Facility (1995) and of
some USD 40 million under a stand-by arrangement, a
three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
totalling some USD 80 million was approved in 1997.
The second tranche of three under this facility was dis-
bursed in July 1998. The World Bank also provided bal-
ance-of-payment support during 1994-97 with several
policy-based loans totalling nearly USD 220 million.
Priority reform areas were privatisation, the restructur-
ing of larger enterprises, the rehabilitation of the banking
sector and the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the
World Bank decided on 9 July 1998 to release the first
of two tranches (each close to USD 29 million) of a
Social Sector Adjustment credit.
The EU supported FYROM through a variety of instru-
ments. Between 1992 and 1995, the EU provided a total
of EUR 85 million mainly in the form of humanitarian
aid. In March 1996, FYROM became eligible for assis-
tance from the PHARE programme; assistance amount-
ing to EUR 25 million a year was programmed for 1996
to 1998. In 1998, the EIB was invited by the Council to
extend loans up to a ceiling of EUR 150 million until
31 December 2000. A first loan agreement (EUR 70 mil-
lion) was signed in July 1998.
In 1997, the Community approved a balance-of-payment
loan of EUR 40 million to cover part of the residual
external financing needs for 1997 and 1998 and so to
support the country's economic stabilisation and reform
programme.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
In the first part of 1997, economic performance did not
improve as expected. After having grown slowly in
1996, industrial production and GDP were again on a
declining trend, exports stagnated and unemployment
reached 36%. Moreover, the balance of payments and
the exchange rate came under pressure.
The authorities decided, in agreement with the IMF, to
devalue the denar by 14% against the DM (to 31 denar
to the DM) in July 1997. At the same time, the authori-
ties declared their intention to persist with their efforts
±1 5±towards economic reform and to take the necessary steps
to avoid the devaluation leading to a major increase in
prices. A programme comprising a wage freeze and a
cut-back in public expenditure was put into effect, which
proved successful in keeping the inflation rate in 1997 at
1.3% and in 1998 at around 1%. Government finances
were almost balanced, with an overall fiscal deficit of
0.4% of GDP in 1997 and an only slightly worse result
for 1998.
The July devaluation contributed to a recovery in output
and export growth after the disappointing figures for the
first half of 1997. GDP growth was around 1.5% in
1997. In the first eight months of 1998, exports increased
by 13% compared to the same period in 1997, and
industrial production rose by 5.8% year-on-year com-
pared to the first eight months of 1997.
While the improvement in the trade balance in the first
8 months of 1998 was limited by a strong rise in imports
(7%), the overall balance of payments improved
thanks to a considerably larger inflow of foreign direct
investment, and the country's foreign exchange reserves
increased by USD 38.6 million to USD 318.6 million.
By the end of 1998, FYROM had cleared all its external
arrears, including those to the Community and the EIB.
3. Structural Reform
In 1997 and 1998, steps were taken to liberalise trade and
encourage foreign direct investment. In December 1997,
excise duties were lowered on 14 agricultural products
and food products by 10 percentage points. Price liberal-
isation has been largely accomplished.
The legal framework was improved by the adoption of a
new employment law and of amendments to the labour
relations law and the Collateral Law. Two laws were
adopted which will contribute to rebalancing the rights
of creditors and debtors in favour of the former. Other
important laws (on denationalisation, on ownership
and an amendment allowing secondary share trading)
were passed. The limited capacity of the judicial system,
however, may impede the implementation of these laws.
Progress was also registered in the supervision of the
banking sector, which resulted in some improvement in
the quality of lending portfolios.
Privatisation has proceeded broadly at the pace envi-
saged under the privatisation programme begun in
1993 and accelerated in 1995. Almost all of the
1216 enterprises, which were identified in the pro-
gramme, had been privatised by mid-1998. The private
sector accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP and
employment. In many cases, however, privatisation was
not accompanied by a change in management and the
necessary restructuring has not been undertaken. Pro-
gress in the break-up and privatisation of agro-industrial
conglomerates has remained limited.
In 1998, a number of major sales to foreign investors
boosted the extremely low foreign direct investment to
some USD 70 million in the first eight months of the
year. Agreements were reached on the (partial) privatisa-
tion of the dominant Stopanska Banka, of Macedonian
Telecom and of a large cement producer.
4. Implementation of Macro-Financial Assistance
Following the Council decision on 22 July 1997 to make
available Community macro-financial assistance of up to
EUR 40 million, the Commission and the authorities of
FYROM agreed on conditions and modalities for the
disbursement of the loan. The conditions included satis-
factory performance under the IMF programme, clear-
ance of all arrears due to the Community and to the
EIB, and a number of measures in the areas of trade
(trade liberalisation, customs code), private sector devel-
opment (promotion of foreign direct investment, bank-
ruptcy legislation) and banking sector supervision and
reform (lending exposure of banks, privatisation).
The Commission released the first tranche of EUR
25 million on 30 September 1997 and, following the ful-
filment of the relevant conditions, the second tranche
(EUR 15 million) on 13 February 1998.
VI. ROMANIA
1. Introduction
In 1997, the government which had been elected in
November 1996 launched a radical programme of
macroeconomic stabilisation and modernisation of the
economy. While growth had resumed in 1994, the rela-
tively satisfactory macroeconomic performances regis-
tered until 1996 masked insufficient progress on structur-
al reforms and restructuring of the enterprise and
agricultural sectors. Breaking with years of timid
reforms, the new government took a number of radical
measures in the first months of 1997, including liberalisa-
tion of most prices and the trade regime, closure of many
large loss making state farms and termination of directed
credits from the central bank to enterprises. At first,
these measures restored the confidence of lenders and
international investors and prompted international
financial institutions (IFIs) to extend fresh loans to
Romania.
However, in the second half of 1997 and most of 1998,
the reform momentum stalled. Continuous internal dis-
sent within the ruling coalition Ðwhich led to a change
of Prime Minister in April 1998 and to frequent replace-
ment of ministersÐ delayed the adoption of key reforms,
encouraged bureaucratic inertia and badly damaged for-
eign investors' confidence. As a result, the economic
situation remained fragile, as testified by the continuous
fall in GDP recorded in both 1997 and 1998, the widen-
ing of the external imbalances in 1998, the accelerated
depreciation of the national currency and repeated
reduction in the country's sovereign rating. Insufficient
progress on restructuring and privatisation of the large
public companies continued to threaten gains achieved
in macroeconomic stabilisation. Towards the end of
1998, however, new steps were taken to restore the
reform momentum, but international confidence
remained low and social protests were increasing.
±1 6±Romania's relations with the IFIs mirrored the uneven
path of reform. After the November 1996 elections, the
IFIs took an active role in advising the new government
on its economic and social policies. Agreement was
reached with the IMF in April 1997 on a USD 430 mil-
lion Stand-by arrangement (SBA). In June 1997, the
World Bank approved USD 550 million of new credits
and the release of the USD 80 million second tranche
of the Financial and Enterprise Structural Adjustment
Loan (FESAL). However, by the second half of 1997,
the slow progress of structural reforms led to an inter-
ruption of disbursements under these loans. The SBA
closed in May 1998 with only two of the five tranches
having been disbursed, while the FESAL closed in spring
1998 with the last tranche not disbursed, despite an
extension of the loan period. The World Bank was not
able to disburse the second tranche of an Agricultural
Structural Adjustment Loan before the end of 1998,
and extended the loan period. Towards the end of
1998, discussions with the IFIs on new structural adjust-
ment loans resumed, and negotiations were expected
to be finalised in the course of the first semester of
1999.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
Romania's macroeconomic performance in 1997 and
1998 was worse than anticipated. After falling by 6.6%
in 1997, it is estimated that GDP fell again in 1998 by
as much as 6-7%. This sharp fall in output was caused
by the overall restrictive stance of monetary, fiscal and
income policies, although there have been periods of pol-
icy relaxation.
One important achievement in 1997 and 1998 has been
the reduction in inflation and the improvement of the
framework of monetary policy. Inflation surged at the
beginning of 1997 (176.9% in March 1997 on an annual
basis) because of price liberalisation and the rapid depre-
ciation of the currency. It subsequently declined to reach
about 42% at the end of 1998. In addition, the special
credits that the National Bank of Romania (NBR) had
been forced to extend to the agriculture and enterprise
sectors were terminated, which allowed it to focus on
its primary responsibility of fighting inflation. This was
achieved through a strict control of the monetary base
and also through the appreciation of the real exchange
rate (although this policy was reversed in the second half
of 1998). Tight monetary policy has led to high nominal
and real interest rates, which have further dampened eco-
nomic activity.
Achieving fiscal discipline in the public sector was one
significant success of the government in 1997. The conso-
lidated general government deficit fell to 3.6% of GDP,
compared to the expected 4.9%. When taking into
account the quasi-fiscal subsidies extended by the NBR
up until 1996, fiscal consolidation was even more pro-
nounced. However, in 1998, the authorities were con-
fronted with increasing difficulties in controlling the fis-
cal situation, mainly due to an absence of significant
progress in implementing structural reforms: revenues
were much lower than expected (due to lower privatisa-
tion receipts and the accumulated tax arrears of state-
owned enterprises). At the same time, pressures for high-
er spending increased. In 1998, two supplementary bud-
gets were approved in order to contain the deficit. More-
over, the financing of the deficit became increasingly
problematic in an environment of high interest rates
and difficult conditions on international markets.
The external accounts became very fragile. In 1997, the
current account deficit amounted to USD 2.4 billion
(6.7% of GDP) and further deteriorated in 1998 (it is
estimated that the deficit will reach USD 3 billion or
about 8% of GDP). The deterioration of the current
account deficit in 1998 was caused by the worsening of
the trade deficit. Indeed, reversing the trend seen in
1997, and despite the fall in domestic demand, exports
fell and imports increased in 1998.
The balance-of-payment constraint has become proble-
matic in 1998, notably because of deteriorating condi-
tions for the financing of the external deficits. Indeed,
while there was a surge of long-term investment in
1997 (notably foreign direct investments) which allowed
the National Bank of Romania to build up its reserves,
this trend was reversed in 1998. Since mid-1997 there
has been a growing reluctance of international investors
to commit resources to Romania. The repeated down-
grading of Romania's sovereign rating in the second half
of 1998 and the impact on emerging markets of the Asian
and Russian crises further complicated the financing of
the country's external financial needs and obligations.
Indeed, external debt service became quite important in
1998 and will further increase in 1999.
In 1998, the authorities introduced a 6% import sur-
charge designed to provide some short-term relief to the
balance of payments. However, this did not tackle the
fundamental causes of the balance-of-payment problems,
which are linked to short term macroeconomic develop-
ments (including the real appreciation of the leu) but
mostly to structural factors, notably the fundamental
weakness of the country's productive base. This in turn
is closely linked to the absence of a meaningful restructur-
ing of many of the large state-owned companies.
3. Structural Reforms
As the experience between 1990 and 1996 has shown, the
hard-won gains of macroeconomic stabilisation can not
be sustained unless substantial restructuring of the public
enterprises is achieved. Although some important steps
were taken in early 1997 and late 1998, the lack of pro-
gress in this area has been the main source of disappoint-
ment and concern.
The new authorities initiated some important structural
reforms in 1997, notably because both the IMF and
the World Bank, in the context of their loan conditional-
ity, put a heavy emphasis on structural criteria. For
example, the external tariff was substantially reduced,
most prices were liberalised, tariffs of the utilities have
been adjusted automatically, capital markets were
further developed and privatisation was accelerated.
While most of these reforms are still in place, the reform
±1 7±momentum stalled in the second half of 1997, and was
only somewhat revived at the end of 1998.
A particularly noteworthy area of progress has been the
liberalisation of the exchange rate market, which was
implemented in February 1997, when the National Bank
of Romania returned their licences to operate on the for-
eign exchange market to all commercial banks and for-
eign banks' branches established in Romania.
Restructuring of the large loss-making public enterprises
remained very slow. While a number of `Re Â gies autono-
mes' were transformed into commercial companies, and
restructuring plans were approved for the electricity,
mining and railways companies, financial discipline did
not make much progress. The amount of arrears, nota-
bly to the state and social security budgets and utilities,
continued to grow, undermining the fiscal position of
the government.
The restructuring of the financial sector did not progress
much. The largest public banks have been unable to
impose financial discipline on state-owned enterprises.
More than half of the commercial banks' assets were
non-performing at the end of 1997. This situation led
the authorities to carry out the massive recapitalisation
of two public banks in 1997 through the issue of govern-
ment bonds amounting to 1.4% and 1.8% of GDP,
respectively. Problems continued to mount in 1998,
and it was widely expected that a new rescue plan was
needed. As a result of their difficulties, banks have cut
drastically their lending to the private sector: the amount
of credit to the non-government sector shrank from
24.5% of GDP at the end of 1996 to 14.4% of GDP
at the end of 1997, and increased only marginally in real
terms in 1998.
Privatisation was uneven. There was an acceleration in
1997, and a lull during most of 1998. The number of
companies that were privatised increased significantly
compared to previous years. However, most of the enter-
prises sold were small- and medium-sized. Of the large
enterprises (usually the largest loss makers and those
with large liabilities), only a small number were sold
and mostly to foreign companies. The national telecom-
munication company was sold in November 1998. Priva-
tisation of two small public banks was repeatedly post-
poned and only one of them was sold at the end of 1998.
4. Implementation of Macro-Financial Assistance
In its decision of 20 June 1994, the Council had decided
to grant to Romania a medium-term balance-of-payment
loan for a maximum amount of EUR 125 million, to be
disbursed in two tranches. A first tranche of EUR 55 mil-
lionwas disbursed in November1995. On 17 March1997,
the Economic and Financial Committee Council
endorsed the Commission's intention to reactivate the
outstanding second tranche, of up to EUR 70 million.
In a supplemental Memorandum of Understanding, the
Commission and the Romanian authorities agreed to
disburse the EUR 70 million second tranche in two pay-
ments, of respectively 40 and up to EUR 30 million. Fol-
lowing the IMF Board approval of the new Stand-by
arrangement in April 1997, a first payment of EUR
40 million was made on 30 September 1997. The second
payment, of EUR 30 million, was made on 23 December
1997, following the positive evaluation by the Commis-
sion services of progress in macroeconomic stabilisation
and structural reforms.
On 19 November 1997, a High Level G-24/Consultative
Group meeting took place in Brussels, which reviewed
Romania's balance-of-payment situation and the exter-
nal financing needs for 1998 and beyond. In the light
of the IMF's assessment, it was agreed that there was
no need for further balance-of-payment assistance from
bilateral donors (including the Community) for 1998.
On 18 March 1998, Romania repaid on time the first
tranche of EUR 185 million of the first EC macro-finan-
cial loan. At the end of 1998, the Commission expressed
its intention to support Romania in the context of a new
programme of macroeconomic stabilisation and struc-
tural reforms to be supported by new IMF and World
Bank structural adjustment loans.
VII. UKRAINE
1. Introduction
Although the Ukrainian economy further stabilised in
1997 and 1998, mainly because of the restrictive policies
of the central bank, there has been limited progress with
respect to key structural reforms which could firmly put
the country on to a path of sustainable growth. After a
series of fiscal slippages in the run-up to the
March 1998 parliamentary elections, Ukraine's econom-
ic situation remained fragile and vulnerable to exogenous
shocks.
In the latter months of 1998, as international investors
reassessed the risks of investing in emerging economies,
the Ukraine became a focus of attention. Investors were
particularly preoccupied by the risk of default on Ukrai-
ne's external and domestic debt, and this fear triggered
large withdrawals of portfolio investment from the coun-
try's financial markets during the autumn of 1998 and
put the national currency (the hryvna) under consider-
able pressure.
2. Macroeconomic Performance
Despite significant progress in macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion achieved in Ukraine in recent years (inflation was
reduced from 400% in 1994 to 10% in 1997, and the
contraction of real GDP was scaled down from 23%
in 1994 to 3% in 1997), the general economic situation
remained fragile. This was mainly due to delays in the
implementation of key structural reforms which would
permit the country to develop fully its economic poten-
tial, improve its public finances (the budget deficit was
5.6% of GDP in 1997) and get on to a path of sustain-
able growth.
Some positive trends were established in the first eight
months of 1998. Real GDP grew by 0.2% for the first
time since independence in 1991, and inflation was under
±1 8±control thanks to the central bank's tight monetary pol-
icy (year-on-year inflation was 6.9% in August). These
trends, however, were reversed when international inves-
tors started to reassess the risks of investment in Eastern
Europe in the aftermath of the Asian and, especially, the
Russian crisis. Since Ukraine had engaged in large-scale
short-term borrowing in 1997, investors were preoccu-
pied with the risk of default on external and domestic
debt maturing in the second half of 1998. This fear trig-
gered large withdrawals of portfolio investment from
Ukraine's financial markets in the final months of 1998.
In view of the considerable pressure on the hryvna and
the significant debt servicing to be carried out by the
end of the year, the authorities took two measures to
contain the crisis. They first lowered hryvna's trading
band against the dollar and, second, successfully
rescheduled a large part of Ukraine's short-term external
and internal debt that was due to mature in the second
half of 1998 in the framework of a scheme, agreed with
the creditors (thus avoiding a unilateral restructuring,
as had happened in Russia).
Furthermore, the authorities approved a three-year eco-
nomic programme covering the period July 1998-June
2001, supported by a USD 2.2 billion Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) from the IMF. The programme's key
objectives are real GDP growth of 4% in 2001 (against
ÿ3% in 1997) and inflation of 7% in 2001 (against
10% in 1997). It further provides for a wide range of
structural reforms, including the strengthening of fiscal
institutions (especially the tax and customs administra-
tion), and reductions in the size of the government, as
well as progress in privatisation, deregulation and
administrative reforms. At the end of the reporting per-
iod, the implementation of the EFF was however sus-
pended because of both fiscal and structural slippages
but the IMF intended soon to review the situation in
order to assess compliance with the programme and pos-
sibly to resume disbursements.
3. Structural Reforms
The authorities' efforts to launch comprehensive struc-
tural reforms have often faced the opposition of sizeable
conservative forces in Parliament. As a result, progress
with reforms in 1997 and 1998 was erratic, uneven and
mainly concentrated in the privatisation of small enter-
prises and in the restructuring of the agriculture and
energy sectors.
Although the privatisation of small enterprises has been
virtually completed, the privatisation of large enterprises
has practically stagnated as a result of both administra-
tive delays and lack of interest by investors. In the agri-
cultural sector, the state order system for grain was elimi-
nated at the state government level, but farmers
continued to be under pressure to sell to the government,
as restructuring and privatisation of the national bread
corporation was delayed.
Considerable progress was achieved in reforming the
energy sector. In the electricity sector, a competitive
wholesale market was established, but wholesale prices
were not fully passed through to retail prices and the
financial position of the sector deteriorated. However,
in co-operation with the World Bank, the authorities
developed a financial recovery plan for this sector in
April 1998, increased tariffs for households by 25% in
May, and started to implement measures to improve col-
lection. In the gas sector, regional restrictions on domes-
tic gas sales were eliminated and prices for industrial and
commercial consumers were freed. Furthermore, the
government began to auction part of the Russian gas
received as a transit fee. In the coal sector, the reforms
envisaged under the original programme agreed with
the World Bank were not implemented and, as a result,
this sector continued to be a drain on the budget (the set-
tlement of miners' wage arrears became a political pro-
blem before the parliamentary elections and led to bud-
getary over-runs, although these payments were not
budgetary obligations).
4. Implementation of Macro-Financial Assistance
The European Community has to date provided Ukraine
with two macro-financial loans (the first loan of EUR
85 million was decided by the Council in 1994 and dis-
bursed in 1995 and the second of up to EUR 200 million
was decided in 1995 and disbursed in two tranches of
EUR 100 million each in 1996 and 1997 respectively).
The Council decided on 15 October 1998 to grant
Ukraine a third macro-financial loan of up to EUR
150 million to be released in at least two tranches. As
with the two previous Community loans, the disburse-
ment of the tranches of this third loan would depend
on: (a) a satisfactory track record for Ukraine's macroe-
conomic programme recently agreed with the IMF in the
context of the EFF, and (b) progress with respect to
structural reforms, including the observance of a number
of performance criteria to be attached to this loan.
The Commission services agreed with the Ukrainian
authorities a series of performance criteria for the disbur-
sement of the first tranche of the loan. They relate to
trade liberalisation; the reform of the financial sector,
which is suffering from both structural weakness and
the spill-over effects of the emerging markets' crisis; the
improvement of foreign investment conditions; and the
acceleration of the reform of Ukraine's energy sector.
The first tranche is expected to be of EUR 50 million
and will be released when the EFF is back on track.
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Principal economic policy measures Ð June/July/August 1999
Community (EU-15)
3/4.6 The Cologne European Council welcomes the Ecofin Coun-
cil's draft recommendation on the Broad Economic Policy Guide-
lines 1999 and recommends its adoption to the Council.
12.7 The Ecofin Council formally adopts the Council recommen-
dation on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 1999.
Belgium (B)
None.
Denmark (DK)
17.6 The Nationalbank lowers the repo rate by 5 basis points to
2.85%. The discount rate remains unchanged at 2.75%. The pre-
mium to ECB's refinancing rate is thereby reduced to 0.35%.
31.8 The Danish government presents the draft budget bill for cen-
tral government for 2000, scheduled to be adopted by mid Decem-
ber. The draft budget for central government foresees a surplus of
DKK 7.9 billion next year, corresponding to 0.6% of GDP. The
central government debt ratio is targeted to be reduced by 2 percen-
tage points during 2000 and amount to 44.0% of GDP. Together
with projections for local governments, general government would
reach a surplus of DKK 28.8 billion, corresponding to 2.3% of
GDP.
Germany (D)
23.6 A first draft proposal for the federal budget for the year 2000
is presented by the government. Expenditures are expected to reach
DEM 478.2 billion compared to DEM 485.7billion in 1999. The fed-
eral deficit is expected to decline from DEM 53.5 billion in the cur-
rent year to DEM 49.5 billion next year. Compared to the new gov-
ernment's original medium-term planning, savings of more than
DEM 30 billion are now proposed, of which DEM 12.5 billion are
by the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (slower increase in
pensions; reduction in social security benefits for the unemployed).
The government also presents a first blueprint for the envisaged
reform of corporate taxes in 2001. It aims to bring the highest tax
rate down to 35%, `financed' partially by the closing of tax loop-
holes. The corporate sector, however, is to get a tax relief of about
DEM 8 billion in 2001 only.
25.8 The Federal Government adopts the proposal on the budget
for the year 2000, the proposed changes regarding family allowances
(in line with the ruling by the Constitutional Court) and the further
steps of the ecological tax reform.
Greece (EL)
28.7 The Bank of Greece takes additional measures to limit credit
expansion.
Spain (E)
18.6 The government approves the draft for Reforming the Law
for the Defence of Competition.
18.6 The government approves the establishment of reference
prices for medicines financed by the Social Security System, to be
applied from September 1999.
France (F)
None.
Ireland (IRL)
None.
Italy (I)
15.6 Treasury Minister Mr. Amato declares before the Parliament
that to reach the budget deficit target of 1.5% of GDP in 2000,
as foreseen in the Stability Programme, the government aims to
carry out expenditure cuts of 0.8% of GDP (ITL 16 trillion or
8.3 billion) with the next Budget Law.
30.6 The government approves the Document for Economic and
Financial Planning (DPEF) for 2000-2003, setting the targets for
growth and public finances. The general government deficit is tabled
at 2.4% of GDP this year, 1.5% in 2000, 1% in 2001, with the
objective of reaching the target of a ``close to balance'' deficit of
0.1% of GDP in 2003.
29.7 The Parliament adopts the four-year economic plan (DPEF)
for 2000-2003.
Luxembourg (L)
None.
Pays-Bas (NL)
None.
Austria (A)
17.6 The Parliament approves the tax reform to take effect next
year. Together with the recent ``family package'' the net tax relief
amounts to some ATS 30 billion ( 2.2 billion) or some 1.1% of
GDP. The reform's central element is a reduction of income tax rates
in the middle income ranges.
Portugal (P)
18.6 The finance minister blocks a strategic agreement (cross-parti-
cipation) between the Champalimaud's financial group (Portugal's
third largest) and the Santander group (the largest Spanish financial
group).
Finland (FIN)
1.6 The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy decides to publish
recommendations on privatisation policy.
26.7 Government agrees budget proposal for 2000 with projected
general government surplus of 4{4,17}% of GDP, up from 3% in
1999, but defers main tax decisions until outcome is known of cur-
rent centralised wage negotiations (implying tax concessions are con-
ditional on moderate settlements).
26.7 Government approves revised Stability Programme for 2000-
2003.
Sweden (S)
3.6 The Swedish Riksbank announces in its Inflation Report that it
is tracking the underlying inflation rate (UND1X) closely, in addi-
tion to the official inflation measure, the headline inflation rate
(CPI). In particular, monetary policy is influenced by the forecast
of the underlying inflation rate.
United Kingdom (UK)
10.6 The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee cuts the
official repo rate by 0.25% to 5.0% with immediate effect.
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